


Documenting Xinjiang's detention system

Nathan Ruser



About the authors

Nathan Ruser is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the team at ASPI including Daria Impiombato, Tracy Beattie, Kelsey Munro and Dr James Leibold for their work on this project; and ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre Deputy Director Danielle Cave and Director Fergus Hanson for their support and guidance.

This research builds on the work of others including journalists, researchers and other civil society representatives. The author gratefully acknowledges this research and reporting.

We are grateful to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for supporting this research project. ASPI was awarded a research grant from the US Department of State, which was used towards this report. More detail about that grant, and the research activities it supports, can be found here: <https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/about/>. The work of ASPI ICPC would not be possible without the support of our partners and sponsors across governments, industry and civil society.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia's defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI's sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

ASPI

Tel +61 2 6270 5100

Email enquiries@aspi.org.au

www.aspi.org.au

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 [facebook.com/ASPI.org](https://www.facebook.com/ASPI.org)

 [@ASPI_ICPC](https://twitter.com/ASPI_ICPC)

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the *Copyright Act 1968*, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published September 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),


ISSN 2209-9670 (print)



Funding for this report
was provided by the
US Department of State

Documenting Xinjiang's detention system

Nathan Ruser



Contents

Our key research findings	03
How did we find these 380 detention camps?	04
What were we looking for?	05
Background	05
Tiers of detention facilities	06
Tier 1: Suspected lower security re-education camps	06
Tier 2: Suspected dedicated re-education camps	08
Tier 3: Suspected detention centres	09
Tier 4: Suspected maximum security prisons	10
Findings	11
Growth of camps is slowing over time	13
Bingtuan prisons and camps	14
Note on non-residential re-education facilities	15
Notes	16

Our key research findings

ASPI researchers have identified and mapped more than 380 suspected detention facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, highlighting ‘re-education’ camps, detention centres and prisons that have been newly built or expanded since 2017. This is the largest database of Xinjiang’s detention facilities in existence, and we believe that it covers most such facilities.

The findings of this research contradict Chinese officials’ claims that all “trainees” from so-called vocational training centres had “graduated”¹ by late 2019. Instead, available evidence² suggests that many extrajudicial detainees in Xinjiang’s vast “re-education” network are now being formally charged and locked up in higher security facilities, including newly built or expanded prisons, or sent to walled factory compounds for coerced labour assignments.

We present satellite imagery evidence that shows newly constructed detention facilities, along with extensions to several existing facilities, that occurred across 2019 and 2020.


At least 61 detention sites have seen new construction and expansion work between July 2019 and July 2020. This includes at least 14 facilities still under construction in 2020, according to the latest satellite imagery available.

Of these, about 50% are higher security facilities, which may suggest a shift in usage from the lower-security, ‘re-education centres’ toward higher-security prison-style facilities.

At the same time, according to satellite data we have examined, at least 70 facilities appear to have been desecuritized by the removal of internal fencing or perimeter walls. This includes 8 camps that show signs of decommissioning, and it is possible they have been closed. 90% of desecuritized camps are lower security facilities.

For the purposes of classification and analysis, we have categorised these detention facilities into four tiers. These four tiers reflect genuine differences in the securitisation of camps, in which, for example, lower tier camps have lower security features than others (see full analysis on page 6).

This database builds on the work of others,³ is publicly available for researchers or journalists to reference, and will continue to be updated if and when new facilities are found or our analysis of these facilities changes.



How did we find these 380 detention camps?

Our effort to find as many of the detention facilities in Xinjiang as possible has spanned over two years. In mid-2018, following eyewitness accounts, media reports and the work of other researchers (most notably Shawn Zhang in Canada)⁴ In documenting the construction of detention camps in Xinjiang, we began to scour satellite images and official construction tender documents.

By the end of 2018, we had found roughly 100 camps and were confident enough in our evidence base to publish the locations of nearly 30,⁵ in each case measuring their size and physical expansion since the crackdown began in 2017.

Since then, when our researchers had capacity, we continued looking for camps using a number of research methods. These include, for example, verifying camps mentioned in media reports and government documents, contacting journalists and others who have visited Xinjiang, and systematically collecting, searching and comparing satellite imagery.

One of the most effective methods was the examination of night-time satellite imagery from Xinjiang. Because the vast majority of the camps that we located were built on previously unused land in remote or peri-urban areas, it was possible to compare illuminated areas in the first few months of 2017 - before most of those camps had been constructed - with presently illuminated areas. The new areas of night-time light emissions were cross-referenced against high-resolution daytime satellite imagery that showed much greater detail. We discovered that many of the newly illuminated areas in these parts of Xinjiang were either newly constructed detention facilities or significant new highway checkpoints used to monitor the movement of people across Xinjiang.

For dense urban areas, we manually searched satellite imagery for new camps with help from journalists and other researchers who visited Xinjiang. A few sites were also discovered based on victims' testimony. Most of their accounts have been published in full by the Xinjiang Victims Database.⁶

Additionally, several other researchers have attempted to map a large section of Xinjiang's camps, most recently Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan.⁷ Using a different methodology, they independently confirmed many of the sites that we had been looking at and their investigation also unearthed roughly 30 that we had missed.

We don't believe that every detention facility has yet been located, and thus invite any new information that might lead to new camps being included in our database.

What were we looking for?

At their simplest, detention facilities are large, residential and highly securitised areas from which free movement is prevented by a combination of walls, watchtowers and barbed-wire fencing. Higher security facilities are distinctive and share identical distinguishing architectural features.

Lower security facilities can look superficially similar to public facilities such as schools or hospitals. A key feature that reliably distinguishes detention facilities from schools is an extensive network of barbed wire fencing that cages individual buildings, restricting the access detainees have to outside areas and channelling people through wire ‘tunnels’ between buildings. Since 2019, barbed-wire fences have been removed from approximately 70 of the camps we examined, however, the majority of these facilities still have highly securitised infrastructure such as barbed wire internal fencing, external walls and watchtowers.

Another key visual clue that can distinguish detention facilities is the lack of cars inside the facility and the absence of people in the satellite imagery acting normally and casually in an area well imaged by satellites. For example, most schools and other educational facilities will show students walking around between classes and to outside areas to socialise and play sport.

Camps are also often co-located with factory complexes, which can suggest the nature of a facility and highlight the relationship between arbitrary detention in Xinjiang and forced labour.⁸

Background

Since 2017, the Chinese government has intensified its crackdown in the far-western region of China known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.⁹ The campaign, targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim nationalities, has permanently changed nearly every aspect of society and sought to alter the thoughts and behaviour of the regions’ minority communities. The Uyghurs, who are the largest indigenous ethnic population of the region, have seen their places of worship destroyed and their movements and behaviour closely monitored and controlled—even in their own homes.¹⁰ China has built hundreds of large-scale detention facilities across the deserts in Xinjiang and on the outskirts of cities and towns. Over the past three years, as many as a million Uyghurs and other minorities have been detained in these facilities against their will.¹¹

Xinjiang’s carceral system is the coercive backbone that underpins all other aspects of the government’s crackdown against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. The ever-present threat of arbitrary detention forecloses avenues of resistance that were once available to Uyghurs and other non-Han nationalities.¹²

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) official messaging seeks to characterise the lower security detention facilities as ‘vocational schools’ and pivot global attention away from them.¹³ For two years, the CCP outright denied the existence of these ‘re-education’ camps.¹⁴ Their denial was met with an overwhelming body of evidence to the contrary, including journalists’ reporting out of Xinjiang,¹⁵ satellite images of the camps,¹⁶ testimony from camp survivors,¹⁷ and now leaked official documents.¹⁸ In December 2019, officials in Xinjiang claimed that all those ‘studying’ in these camps had been released.¹⁹ But this claim is contradicted by the new evidence in this database.

Tiers of detention facilities

For the purposes of classification and analysis, we have categorised this database of detention facilities into four tiers. The tiers reflect genuine differences in the securitisation of camps, in which, for example, lower tier camps have lower security features than others. We suspect that there's an administrative difference between these levels of detention; however, the opaque nature of Xinjiang's carceral system makes it difficult to ensure that our different tiers correspond to any official classifications or types of detention facility, and further research is required to document the role of these camps within Xinjiang's political and legal system.

Tier 1: Suspected lower security re-education camps

Tier 1 camps are the lowest security facilities. Generally, they are pre-existing buildings that have been transformed into detention facilities through the erection of significant external walls and internal fencing. In most cases, these facilities were previously schools, but residential complexes, hospitals and quarantine facilities have also been converted into camps. During 2017 and 2018, these camps generally featured significant internal barbed-wire fencing, designed to curtail the movement of detainees within and between buildings. That includes structures that appear to channel detainees between buildings through fenced tunnels. Although no photos of those tunnels are known to exist, they are likely to look similar to the one in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Immigration offices in the Xinjiang/Kazakh border town of Khorgas



Source: Amira 7777777, Google Maps, October 2019, [online](#).


In many tier 1 camps, this fencing was removed in recent years (mostly in 2019). In many cases, recreational facilities have also been added, such as basketball mats and table-tennis tables (Figure 2). Some reports suggest that many detainees in this tier of camps have been released (or transferred to higher security facilities or coerced labour assignments) under an apparent propaganda push by Chinese officials eager to claim that all 're-education' detainees have 'graduated' in December 2019.²⁰

Figure 2: 3D model of a tier-one camp near Kashgar city, Kashgar Prefecture



Source: Designed by Orion_Int using satellite imagery and data provided by ASPI ICPC. Coordinates: 39.4542N, 76.1097E


Tier 1 camps are the only level of detention that Chinese officials have brought journalists and diplomats to visit on carefully managed, Potemkin-village-style tours.²¹ This is probably because the camps are genuinely designed to ‘rehabilitate’ and politically indoctrinate detained individuals, despite the extrajudicial nature of their detention. There is evidence that detainees ‘released’ from these camps have gone into either forced labour assignments or strictly controlled residential surveillance.²² Therefore, these facilities have classrooms and can support the misleading narrative that they’re designed to purely ‘educate’ or ‘train’ detainees.



Tier 2: Suspected dedicated re-education camps

Tier 2 facilities appear to be specifically built for the detention of Uyghurs and other non-Han minorities. They tend to be far larger facilities with many identical residential buildings. To some extent, these facilities have been slightly desecuritized in 2019 and 2020, and a number of internal walls and barbed-wire fences have been removed. In most cases, they retain a large external wall and often watchtowers, which suggests that the detainees in these facilities are far more carefully surveilled and restricted in their movements (Figure 3).

Figure 3: 3D model of a tier-two camp Konaxahar County, Kashgar Prefecture



Source: Designed by Orion_Int using satellite imagery and data provided by ASPI ICPC. Coordinates: 39.3578N, 76.0528E


Despite the higher security of these camps, reports also suggest that they're designed for the 'rehabilitation' of individuals deemed a danger to society in the eyes of local authorities in Xinjiang.²³ Our analysis of satellite evidence suggests that a number of detainees from these facilities may have been released or transferred elsewhere. This is suggested by the removal of fencing and security features, fewer cars in their external car parks, and the lack of expansion and construction of this tier of camps in late 2019 and 2020.

The only photos that exist of these facilities (other than photos of a construction banner occasionally posted in local media) are from activist groups in Xinjiang that operated in 2017 and 2018.²⁴

Tier 3: Suspected detention centres


Tier 3 facilities appear to be intended to remove people from society, with little intention for serious rehabilitation. They have no factory warehouses or vocational amenities that could nominally be used to train detainees for a future in factory work. They are fully enclosed by a rectangle of high concrete walls, regular watchtowers and several layers of barbed-wire fencing. There's generally an aerial walkway so guards can access the perimeter wall without entering the facility. Likewise, there is often a building where new detainees are sent and processed on arrival, and then funnelled through a narrow concrete channel into the detention centre (Figure 4).

Figure 4: 3D model of a Tier 3 Centre Wensu County, Aksu Prefecture



Source: Designed by Orion_Int using satellite imagery and data provided by ASPI ICPC. Coordinates: 41.0853N, 80.3999E


A significant number of these facilities have seen notable construction since July 2019. In addition, several newly built facilities have opened in the second half of 2019 and in 2020. The bulk of this new construction has taken place after the announcement by Chinese authorities that all detainees had been released. At least fourteen facilities (mostly in this tier and Tier 4) remain under construction.



Tier 4: Suspected maximum security prisons

Prison-like Tier 4 facilities appear to represent the formal prison system in Xinjiang, in which detainees are transferred following a formal sentencing process in the judicial system.²⁵ Before the 2017 crackdown, there were small prisons in most Xinjiang counties, often with a single cell block, in the centre of the city. Now there are far more facilities. Most of the new facilities are considerably larger than pre-2017 prisons in Xinjiang, often with dozens of cell blocks (Figure 5). They are constructed on previously empty land at some distance from any major settlement. They are often co-located with Tier 2 or 3 detention facilities. A number of older prisons across Xinjiang, generally the smaller county prisons, have been demolished since 2017, and their detainees have presumably been moved to these larger facilities away from the cities. No street-level photos exist of these newly constructed prisons in Xinjiang.

Figure 5: 3D model of a Tier Four prison Markit County, Kashgar Prefecture




Source: Designed by Orion_Int using satellite imagery and data provided by ASPI ICPC. Coordinates: 38.8367N, 77.7056E

Findings

Our research findings contradict Chinese officials' claims that all re-education camp detainees had "graduated" by late 2019 (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Detention facilities in our database showing signs of desecuritisation (yellow) or expansion (blue), by tier.



Source: ASPI ICPC

At least 61 detention sites have seen new construction or expansion between July 2019 and July 2020. This includes at least 14 new facilities - mostly prisons - still under construction in 2020, according to the latest satellite imagery available.

Of these, about 50% are higher security facilities, which may suggest a shift in usage from the lower-security, 're-education centres' toward higher-security prison-style facilities.

This includes a brand new facility built next door to a vocational and technical school in Kashgar that was, until April 2020, funded by the World Bank.²⁶ The facility opened for the first time in January 2020 (see Figure 7). It is fully surrounded by a 14 metre high perimeter wall, with 10 metre watchtowers built on top of the wall at regular intervals. The 13 residential buildings are five storeys tall and total 100,000m² of floor space. We estimate that this single newly constructed facility can accommodate over 10,000 people.

Figure 7: Satellite imagery of the new facility near Kashgar in January 2020



Source: Maxar via Google Earth. Coordinates: 39.3972N, 75.9603E

According to the satellite data that we have examined, approximately 70 camps appear to have been significantly desecuritized, this includes at least 8 camps that show signs of decommissioning and have possibly been closed.


90% of the camps that showed signs of desecuritisation were lower security (Tier 1 and 2) facilities; this includes 58.2% from Tier 1 in our database. By contrast, about 50% of the camps that have undergone expansion and construction in the past year are higher security facilities (Tiers 3 and 4 in our database).

Whilst not conclusive, this fits with reporting and survivor testimony that suggests a significant number of detainees that have not shown satisfactory progress in political indoctrination camps have been transferred to higher security facilities, which expanded to accommodate them.²⁷


Growth of camps is slowing over time

Additionally, we counted the number of buildings in approximately 350 facilities every year since the crackdown began. Although these figures are rough (See Figure 8), we believe they reliably show broad trends across time.

Figure 8: Number of buildings in 350 analysed Xinjiang detention facilities, per year




Source: ASPI/ICPC



In both 2018 and 2019, the number of buildings across these 350 facilities saw a 37% rate of annual growth, expanding from 2,321 buildings in 2017 to 3,180 buildings in 2018 to 4,366 buildings in 2019. In 2020 however, that growth has slowed to 5%, with the number of buildings having reached 4,588. (See Figure 9) This statistic is likely partially a result of biases in the dates of satellite imagery accessed, but also partially representative of a genuine trend in slowed building growth. Indeed, by limiting the facilities counted to the approximately 230 sites with imagery from 2020 - and thereby eliminating one of the sources of bias - the slowing of growth became less, but still noticeably, pronounced.

Figure 9: Annual growth rate of new detention facility buildings



Source: ASPI ICPC

Bingtuan prisons and camps

Bingtuan prisons and camps are owned and operated by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan 兵团 in Chinese), which is a paramilitary organisation tasked with expanding colonial settlements in Xinjiang.²⁸

Due to difficulties in attributing the ownership of detention facilities in Xinjiang, these facilities haven't been specifically coded in our dataset. Facilities, which could reasonably be run by the Bingtuan due to their proximity to Bingtuan settlements, are generally tagged as either Tier 3 or Tier 4 facilities based on their design features.


These suspected bingtuan facilities are generally small and located in far-flung agricultural communes. The degrees to which they are being used in the post-2017 crackdown on Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities is unknown. Most of them have not been substantially expanded since 2017.

It is possible they are primarily used to detain exiled Han prisoners from elsewhere in China, with limited take-up of Uyghur detainees, although a number of suspected Bingtuan camps have added floorspace in the past two years (and thus are included in our database). Reports suggest that these facilities do detain Uyghurs and other non-Han nationalities.²⁹

Note on non-residential re-education facilities

It is clear that a large number of towns and cities in Xinjiang have quite extensive centres for day learning or ‘community correction’.³⁰ These non-residential facilities are very different from the sites meant to house detainees but can still be considered part of the ‘re-education’ network, as they require residents to visit for day-classes on regular occasions.

It is possible that these facilities have mostly been retired after people have completed their syllabus. If that’s the case, the buildings have probably been repurposed into other government official buildings or perhaps into real classrooms. These facilities are outside the scope of this dataset, but should be noted here as an element of Xinjiang’s post-2017 ‘re-education’ system.



Notes

- 1 Xinhua, 'Trainees in Xinjiang education, training program have all graduated: Official', *Xinhua*, 9 December 2019, [online](#).
- 2 Chris Buckley, 'China's prisons swell after deluge of arrests engulfs Muslims', *The New York Times*, 31 August 2019, [online](#); Gene A. Bunin, 'Detainees are trickling out of Xinjiang's camps', *Foreign Policy*, 19 January 2019, [online](#); Darren Byler, 'How companies profit from forced labor in Xinjiang', *SupChina*, 4 September 2019, [online](#); Vicky Xu et. al, 'Uyghurs for Sale', ASPI, 1 March 2020, [online](#).
- 3 Including Shawn Zhang ([online](#)), Adrian Zenz ([online](#)), *Human Rights Watch* ([online](#)), and reporters such as Megha Rajagopalan at *Buzzfeed* ([online](#)) and John Sudworth at the *BBC* ([online](#)).
- 4 Zhang's early work on the camps is available [online](#).
- 5 Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, Nathan Ruser, 'Mapping Xinjiang's 're-education' camps', ASPI, Canberra, November 2018, [online](#).
- 6 The Xinjiang Victims Database is available [online](#).
- 7 Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, Christo Buschek, 'Built to last', *Buzzfeed*, 27 August 2020, [online](#).
- 8 Nathan Ruser, 'What satellite imagery reveals about Xinjiang's labour camps and coerced labour', *The Strategist*, 15 July 2019, [online](#).
- 9 James Leibold, 'The spectre of instability: The CCP's mass internment strategy in Xinjiang', *China Leadership Monitor*, 1 March 2019, [online](#).
- 10 Darren Byler, 'China's Government has ordered a million citizens to occupy Uyghur homes. Here's what they think they're doing', *ChinaFile*, 24 October 2018, [online](#).
- 11 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked files expose how China organised mass detention of Muslims", *The New York Times*, 16 November 2019, [online](#).
- 12 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, 'Understanding China's 'preventive repression' in Xinjiang', Brookings Institution, 4 March 2020, [online](#); James Millward and Dahlia Peterson, 'China's system of oppression in Xinjiang: How it developed and how to curb it,' Brookings Institution, September 2020, [online](#).
- 13 Nick Cumming-Bruce. "No Such Thing": China denies U.N. reports of Uyghur detention camps', *New York Times*, 13 August 2018, [online](#).
- 14 Eva Dou, Josh Chin, 'China: Xinjiang camps are actually vocational schools for criminals', *Wall Street Journal*, 13 August 2018, [online](#); The happiest Muslims in the world: disinformation, propaganda, and the Uyghur crisis, Uyghur Human Rights Project, July 2020, [online](#). For an example of state media propaganda, see 'CGTN exclusive: A tour of a closed "re-education camp" in Xinjiang', CGTN, 30 December 2019, [online](#).
- 15 Chris Buckley, 'China is detaining Muslims in vast numbers. The goal: "Transformation".' *The New York Times*, 8 September 2018, [online](#).
- 16 John Sudworth, 'China's hidden camps: What's happened to the vanished Uyghurs of Xinjiang?' *BBC News*, 24 October 2018, [online](#).
- 17 Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, 'What they saw: Ex-prisoners detail the horrors of China's detention camps', *BuzzFeed News*, 27 August, 2020, [online](#).
- 18 ICIJ Investigation: China Cables," International consortium of Investigative Journalists, 24 November, [online](#); Adrian Zenz, "The Karakax List: Dissecting the anatomy of Beijing's internment drive in Xinjiang," *The Journal of Political Risk*, 8.2 (February 2020), [online](#).
- 19 Hua Xia, 'Trainees in Xinjiang education, training program have all graduated: official'; Yanan Wang, 'China claims everyone in Xinjiang camps has "graduated"', *Associated Press*, 9 December 2019, [online](#).
- 20 For example, this interview in Chinese state media with Humargul Abdulsattar, an ex-detainee from Kashgar Vocational Education Training Centre, who is now in a labour placement program. See Youtube, 15 March 2019, [online](#); Xinjiang Victim Database, nd., [online](#).
- 21 Kate Wong, David Bogi, 'How China uses Muslim press trips to counter claims of Uyghur abuse', *The Guardian*, 23 August 2020, [online](#); Karen Leigh, 'China takes diplomats to tour "re-education camps" as pressure builds over mass detention of Uyghurs', *Time*, 7 January 2019, [online](#).
- 22 Maya Wang, 'Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China's campaign of repression against Xinjiang's Muslims', Human Rights Watch, 9 September 2018, [online](#).
- 23 Massimo Introvigne, 'New Exclusive Video: Another "Transformation through Education" camp for Uyghurs exposed in Xinjiang', *Bitter Winter*, 19 September 2020, [online](#).
- 24 See, for example, Li Zaili, 'More camps for Muslims' (videos), *Bitter Winter*, 23 September 2020, [online](#); Li Zaili, "Camps for Uyghurs, 'Schools' or Jails?" *Bitter Winter*, 12 November 2018, [online](#).
- 25 Chris Buckley, 'China's prisons swell after deluge of arrests engulfs Muslims', *The New York Times*, 31 August 2019, [online](#).
- 26 Author conversation with World Bank Group spokesperson, September 2020; Alan Rappeport, 'World Bank scales back program in China's Xinjiang region', *The New York Times*, 11 November 2019, [online](#).
- 27 Chris Buckley, 'China's prisons swell after deluge of arrests engulfs Muslims', *The New York Times*, 31 August 2019, [online](#); Gene A. Bunin, 'Detainees are trickling out of Xinjiang's camps', *Foreign Policy*, 19 January 2019, [online](#).
- 28 For more information on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, see, for example, *The Bingtuan: China's paramilitary colonizing force in East Turkestan*, Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 2018, [online](#); James D Seymour, James (2000) 'Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the sinification of Eastern Turkestan', *Inner Asia*, 2000, 2(2):171-193, [online](#); AFP, 'US imposes sanctions on Chinese "state-within-a-state" linked to Xinjiang abuses', *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, [online](#).
- 29 Yi Xiaocuo, 'Recruiting loyal stabilisers: on the banality of carceral colonialism in Xinjiang', *Made in China Journal*, 25 October 2019, [online](#).
- 30 Xue Yang, 'Community corrections programs in China: new forms of informal punishments?', *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal*, January 2018, 19(1), [online](#).

